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The Trademark Dilution Revision Act—
A Consumer Perspective 
Paul Alan Levy∗
The proposed Trademark Dilution Revision Act1 should be 
considered from a litigation perspective, not only a theoretical 
analysis of how dilution law ought to be configured.  The 
following analysis of the bill is based on the realities of trademark 
litigation as seen from the trenches while representing and advising 
individuals or small businesses that have been sued, or threatened 
with suit, for using trademarks, not for the purpose of selling 
competing goods, but to enhance their expression by invoking 
trademarks. 
An early case brought against Public Citizen2 provides a useful 
point of reference.  In 1982, Public Citizen’s Health Research 
Group published a book about the dangers posed by a class of 
tranquilizers, the benzodiazepines, that it felt were being widely 
over-prescribed and abused.3  Valium was by far the most widely 
known and the best advertised example of that class of drugs.4 The 
authors chose the title “Stopping Valium” because that was the 
most pithy way to catch public attention and tell people what the 
book was about.  For simplicity’s sake, the text referred generally 
to “Valium” as denoting the entire class of drugs, but used the term 
∗ B.A, Reed College; J.D. University of Chicago.  As attorneys at Public Citizen 
Litigation Group, Mr. Levy and his colleagues represented the accused infringers and 
diluters, or advised other attorneys who were representing the accused, in a number of the 
cases cited in this article. 
 1 H.R. 683, 109th Cong. (2005). 
  2 Public Citizen is a national non-profit public interest organization.  More information 
is available at http://www.citizen.org. 
 3 EVE BARGMAN, ET AL., STOPPING VALIUM AND ATIVAN, CENTRAX, DALMANE, 
LIBRIUM, PAXIPAM, RESTORIL, SERAX, TRANXENE, XANAX (Warner Books 1983). 
 4 Ron Lacey, Mother’s Little Helper, NEW INTERNATIONALIST, Feb. 1984, available at 
http://www.newint.org/issue132/helper.htm (last visited May 5, 2006). 
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“Valium®” when referring to the specific brand-named drug.5  A 
disclaimer on the first page of the book explained the difference, 
and the full title included, in smaller print, the other brand names 
of the drugs in the benzodiazepine family. 
Hoffman LaRoche, which made Valium, wanted to suppress 
the book.  Apparently, it could not find anything untruthful about 
the product, which might have supported a claim for libel or 
product disparagement.  Instead, it filed a trademark claim.  The 
theory was that it was unfair to characterize the whole class of 
drugs by using the single term “Valium.”  So it asked for damages 
and injunctive relief, including the recall of the 30,000 books that 
Public Citizen had managed to send into the marketplace so that 
they, along with all remaining stocks of the book, could be 
destroyed.6
Public Citizen is a substantial institution.7  It can defend itself, 
using its in-house litigation capability, and it did defend itself in 
this instance.  It called a press conference to denounce Hoffman-
LaRoche’s planned book-burning, which attracted attention to 
Public Citizen’s criticisms and to the company’s bizarre claim.  
Hoffman-LaRoche also had bad luck in drawing a judge who was 
offended by its invocation of the standard emergency relief of the 
sort normally deployed against transient sellers of pirated handbags 
and watches—its request for recall all these books so that they 
could be destroyed.  Hoffman-LaRoche’s motion for a temporary 
restraining order against publication of the book was denied. 
 5 See BARGMAN, supra note 3. 
 6 Details of the litigation are based on the author’s personal recollections as well as 
discussion with the two Litigation Group lawyers who handled the case, John Cary Sims, 
who now teaches at McGeorge School of Law, and David C. Vladeck, who now teaches 
at Georgetown Law Center, and with Joan Levin, a Health Group employee who was one 
of the book’s authors.  The case file was not available. 
 7 Public Citizen, Inc., a § 501(c)(4) consumer advocacy organization, together with the 
associated Public Citizen Foundation, a § 501(c)(3) organization, had more than 
$12 million in expenditures in 2005 according to the tax returns and annual report that 
appear at http://www.citizen.org/about/index.cfm?ID=5165 (last visited Aug. 4, 2006).  
The history of the Litigation Group is recounted in Craig, Courting Change: The Story of 
the Public Citizen Litigation Group.  See also http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Public_Citizen 
(last visited Aug. 4, 2006); http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Public_Citizen_Litigation_Group 
(last visited Aug. 4, 2006). 
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But the trademark specialists with whom Public Citizen’s in-
house counsel were consulting warned that they could not 
guarantee that Public Citizen would win on a motion to dismiss.  
Consequently, Public Citizen had to worry about the costs of 
discovery, which can be both expensive and time consuming.  To 
settle the case, the organization agreed that future versions of the 
book would not refer to Valium alone, but would, instead, use the 
phrase “Valium and its chemical cousins,” and that the disclaimer 
would be more detailed.  Such a face-saving settlement let 
plaintiff’s counsel get something for their client while letting 
Public Citizen out of the case.8
This result was, of course, a victory for Public Citizen; the 
settlement almost makes Hoffman-LaRoche look ridiculous.  But 
the more important point is that even a substantial organization 
with an office full of experienced litigators had to find a way out of 
the case by doing something to make the bully go away.  Most 
people who receive threats of litigation like this cannot defend 
themselves.  If they receive a threat of a suit, or even more 
alarming, notice of an actual suit and a motion for a preliminary 
injunction—such as the two boxes of documents that Carla Virga 
received in Yuba City, California, warning her that she would have 
to come to Memphis to defend a preliminary injunction hearing 
over her use of the names “ServiceMaster” and “Terminix” in the 
meta tags for a web site attacking those companies9—they submit 
quickly.  Trademark lawyers have become notorious for 
threatening litigation over the most questionable claims.  Yet, 
threats of litigation, not to speak of receipt of an actual complaint, 
are highly intimidating because most individuals know nothing 
about trademark law and have no contact with experienced 
trademark counsel.  And, if they consult a local lawyer, they are 
 8 The cover pages and first pages with disclaimers from the original, self-published 
edition, and the mass-market paper back edition published after the litigation, can be 
viewed on Public Citizen’s web site, http://www.citizen.org/litigation/briefs/ 
HealthSafety/articles.cfm?ID=15035 (last visited May 5, 2006). 
 9 Rick Lockridge, Consumers Fight Corporations on Web, But Protests Costly, 
CNN.COM, Mar. 17, 2000, http://archives.cnn.com/2000/TECH/computing/03/17/ 
online.protests/index.html (last visited May 5, 2005).  An archive of information about 
the suit can be found on Ms. Virga’s personal web site at http://www.syix.com/ 
emu/html/svmvv.html. 
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likely to learn how expensive and complicated the defense of 
trademark litigation can be.  In drafting changes to the trademark 
laws, Congress needs to take these practical concerns into 
consideration. 
I. GENERAL CONCERNS ABOUT THE BILL 
A reasonable consumer advocate naturally supports the 
trademark laws in principle.10  Customers often care about the 
source of products or services that they are considering, and the 
expectations created by a mark that has secondary meaning should 
be respected and protected against abuse.  Trademarks play a vital 
role in helping consumers distinguish between the goods and 
services that come from businesses on which they have learned to 
rely to supply what they want in the marketplace, from impostors 
who are trying to trade on some other company’s hard-earned 
reputation.11  Moreover, even though commercial speech enjoys 
substantial protection under the First Amendment,12 a successful 
cause of action against a commercial competitor for trademark 
infringement rests on a finding that the defendant’s use was likely 
to cause consumer confusion, thus fitting squarely within well-
accepted standards for regulating commercial speech to bar “false 
or misleading” statements.13
Dilution law is far less defensible, because it extends protection 
to trademarks as an asset apart from their sole function of 
10 Jessica Litman, Breakfast with Batman: The Public Interest in the Advertising Age, 
108 YALE L.J. 1717 (1999); Ralph S. Brown Jr., Advertising and the Public Interest: 
Legal Protection of Trade Symbols, 108 YALE L.J. 1619 (1999) (reprinting article 
originally published at  57 YALE L.J. 1165 (1948)).  
 11 Anti-Monopoly v. General Mills Fun Group, 611 F.2d 296, 301 (9th Cir. 1979) (“All 
of [the] legitimate trademark purposes derive ultimately from the mark’s representation 
of a single fact: the product’s source.  It is the source denoting function which trademark 
laws protect, and nothing more”); Smith v. Chanel, 402 F.2d 562, 566–69 (9th Cir. 1968) 
(explaining how confining trademark law to this function best serves consumers’ and 
companies’ interests).  See also West Point Mfg. Co. v. Detroit Stamping Co., 222 F.2d 
581, 590 (6th Cir. 1955). 
 12 Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976). 
 13 FTC v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 778 F.2d 35, 43 (D.C. Cir. 1985), 
citing In re RMJ, 455 U.S. 191, 203 (1982); see also Castrol v. Pennzoil, 987 F.2d 939, 
949 (3d Cir. 1993). 
LEVY_ARTICLE_091606_CLEAN 9/17/2006  6:02:43 PM 
2006] TRADEMARK DILUTION AND CONSUMERS 1193 
 
protecting consumers against confusion, and which, indeed, is used 
to suppress completely truthful and non-confusing commercial 
speech by other merchants.  Thus, wholly apart from the 
substantial debate in the literature about whether the expansion of 
trademark law beyond mere prevention of confusion about source 
is improperly anti-competitive,14 dilution law’s limits on truthful 
commercial speech raise serious questions of public policy as well 
as constitutionality.15  Over the years, Public Citizen attorneys 
have defended both the right of businesses to engage in truthful 
commercial speech,16 and the right of state and federal 
governments to regulate commercial speech to ensure that it is not 
misleading.17  Indeed, it was Public Citizen lawyers who brought 
the case that established the modern doctrine of commercial 
speech, because they recognized that protecting the rights of 
businesses to talk about their wares—and their prices—encourages 
competition and hence serves consumers’ interest in obtaining 
better products at lower prices.18
The current bill could, then, have been the occasion to ask 
whether the entire dilution enterprise has been more trouble than it 
is worth, as Professors Farley and Beebe do.19  Along with other 
trademark scholars,20 they have raised a variety of interesting 
 14 E.g., Glynn S. Lunney Jr., Trademark Monopolies, 48 EMORY L.J. 367 (1999). 
 15 In Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, 296 F.3d 894, 905–06 n.7 (9th Cir. 2002), Judge 
Kozinski raised, but did not answer, the issue of whether a dilution injunction in the 
commercial speech context might violate the First Amendment. 
 16 E.g., Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761 (1993) (right of accountant to advertise 
services); Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of the Sup. Ct. of Ohio, 471 U.S. 
626 (1985) (attorney right to advertise using illustration of intra-uterine device). 
 17 E.g., Nike v. Kasky, 539 U.S. 654 (2003). 
 18 Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976).  
Cf. Goldfarb v. Va. State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975) (a Public Citizen case which 
established that the practice of law was subject to the antitrust law, and hence Bar 
schedules for lawyers’ fees constituted price-fixing). 
 19 See Barton Beebe, Search and Persuasion in Trademark Law, 103 MICH. L. REV. 
2020, 2027 (2005).  Christine Haight Farley, Why We Are Confused About the Trademark 
Dilution Law, 16 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1175 (2006).
 20 E.g., Robert N. Klieger, Trademark Dilution: The Whittling away of the Rational 
Basis for Trademark Protection, 58 U. PITT. L. REV. 789, 795 (1997); Malla Pollack, 
Time To Dilute the Dilution Statute and What Not To Do When Opposing Legislation, 78 
J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 519 (1996); Kenneth L. Port, The “Unnatural” 
Expansion of Trademark Rights: Is a Federal Dilution Statute Necessary?, 18 SETON 
HALL LEGIS. J. 433, 447–49 (1994).  See also David J. Franklyn, Debunking Dilution 
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issues about dilution.21  These concerns are of a piece with the 
larger points that dilution can be such a fuzzy concept that over-
enforcement is likely,22 and that the undue expansion of 
intellectual property rights can impose a severe cost on the public 
domain that needlessly limits expression and innovation.23
Regrettably, however, the various scholars who entertain 
private doubts about the enterprise, and publish their doubts in the 
law reviews, never stepped forward to raise those doubts in 
Congress, allowing the “luminaries of the trademark bar” to 
present the impression that the profession was unified in support 
for dilution law.24  Moreover, Congress decided in 1996 to include 
some protections against dilution in the Lanham Act, 25 and Public 
Citizen has opted not to ask Congress to revisit that decision. 
Still, to the extent that some trademark interests want to amend 
the 1996 statute, the burden is on them to make the case that the 
changes are needed.  The main objection to HR 683, the 
Trademark Dilution Revision Act, is that it has serious anti-speech 
implications for consumers.26  Along with other members of its 
coalition to fix the bill,27 Public Citizen confined its advocacy 
Doctrine: Toward a Coherent Theory of the Anti-Free-Rider Principle in American 
Trademark Law, 56 HASTINGS L.J. 117 (2004) (arguing that dilution statute should be 
replaced by rules protecting truly famous and distinctive marks against free riding). 
 21 Id. 
 22 REPORT OF THE FEDERAL LEGISLATION COMMITTEE OF THE ASSOCIATION OF THE BAR 
OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK: PROPOSED AMENDMENT TO FEDERAL DILUTION STATUTE 4–7 
(April 11, 2005), available at http://www.abcny.org/pdf/report/nyc1-560488-6.pdf (last 
visited July 23, 2006) [hereinafter ABCNY REPORT]. 
 23 See generally James Boyle, The Public Domain: Foreword: The Opposite of 
Property?, 66 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1 (2003).  See also WILLIAM M. LANDES & 
RICHARD A. POSNER, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 23–24 
(AEI-Brookings Joint Center for Regulatory Studies 2004) (“Skeptics of government 
should hesitate to extend a presumption of efficiency to a process by which government 
grants rights to exclude competition with the holders of the rights.”). 
 24 Testimony in favor of dilution reform was presented by representatives of the 
American Intellectual Property Law Association (“AIPLA”), International Trademark 
Association (“INTA”), and the Intellectual Property Section of the American Bar 
Association. 
 25 Lanham Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1051–1072, 1091–1096, 1111–1127, 1141, 
1141(a)–(n) (2005). 
 26 H.R. 683, 109th Cong. (2005). 
 27 Public Citizen has been joined by groups ranging from frequent critics of expansive 
intellectual property legislation, such as Public Knowledge and the Electronic Frontier 
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efforts on Capitol Hill to those issues, even if some of the other 
changes seem to be unjustified. 
First, the proposal to amend the definition of famousness to 
resolve the split in the circuits about whether dilution claims can 
be brought over marks that are well-known only in niche 
markets,28 by requiring that the marks be “widely recognized by 
the general consuming public of the United States,”29 seems to be 
a worthwhile one.  Given the significant power that dilution gives 
to suppress truthful commercial speech, it is just as well that the 
range of marks that are given such protection be as narrow as 
possible.  Professor Beebe, in his remarks at the symposium, 
objected to the creation of a category of supermarks that are given 
superpowers, arguing instead that a general principle against free 
riding ought to be extended to all marks or given to none.30  
Perhaps as a strategy for arguing against dilution law in general 
this approach has merit, but in the absence of any serious effort to 
repeal the dilution cause of action, it seems better to limit the range 
of marks that enjoy the illegitimate protection that dilution law 
affords. 
Similarly, the American Civil Liberties Union objected even to 
overruling the Supreme Court’s decision in Moseley v. V Secret 
Foundation, and organizations concerned with the civil liberties implications of the 
legislation, such as the American Civil Liberties Union and the American Library 
Association, to organizations of artists and writers who worried primarily about the 
pragmatic impact of the elimination of the non-commercial use defense and the limitation 
of the scope of the fair use defense on their ability to use trademarks as reference points 
or in the incidental background of their works, such as the Society of Children’s Book 
Writers and Illustrators, the Authors Guild, Volunteer Lawyers for the Arts, Professional 
Photographers of America, Advertising Photographers of America, and American Society 
of Media Photographers.  The abundance of photographers’ organizations in the coalition 
was a specific result of the symposium that spawned this issue of the Law Journal, 
because Edward Greenberg, a New York lawyer who represents creative small business 
people, attended the symposium, took note of the implications of the legislation for his 
creative clients, and helped spread the word in the arts community about the dangerous 
implications of the parts of the legislation on which Public Citizen has concentrated. 
 28 Compare Advantage Rent-a-Car v. Enterprise Rent-a-Car, 238 F.3d 378, 381 (5th 
Cir. 2001) (allowing niche market claims) with TCPIP Holding Co. v. Harr Commc’ns., 
244 F.3d 88, 99 (2d Cir. 2001) (refusing to allow niche market claims). 
 29 H.R. 683, 109th Cong. § 43(c)(2)(A) (2005). 
 30 Barton Beebe, A Defense of the New Federal Trademark Antidilution Law, 16 
FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1143 (2006). 
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Catalogue,31 on the ground that any change that makes it easier to 
enforce dilution law necessarily threatens protected speech.32  
Tempting though it may be to hamper the enforcement of a bad 
provision of the law by creating a very high burden of proof for 
liability, if one accepts the basic decision to protect against 
dilution, then at least one of the policy objections to Moseley on 
the issue that it decided—that as written the dilution law bars only 
“actual dilution” of a famous mark—is sound.33  Insofar as the 
standard of “actual dilution” threatens to bar a claim until the mark 
has already become diluted, that limitation seems inappropriate for 
a statute whose focus is on injunctive relief rather than damages.34  
As the proponents argue, if actual dilution is the prerequisite for 
relief, the owner of a famous mark cannot obtain forward-looking 
relief until the injury that the statute is intended to prevent has not 
only been suffered, but has been suffered long enough for the 
lawsuit to be filed, litigated, and resolved.35  The amendment of 
section 43(c)(1) to authorize injunctive relief when the owner of 
the famous mark has shown that dilution is “likely” seems sound.36
The other main argument for the “likely dilution” standard, 
however—that it has been too hard to enforce the dilution 
subsection under the “actual dilution” standard37—is less than 
compelling.  Because dilution law bars truthful speech, the cause 
of action should be hard to prove.38  Indeed, the data suggest that 
 31 Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, 537 U.S. 418 (2003). 
 32 American Civil Liberties Union Testimony at a Hearing on H.R. 638, “The 
Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2005,” February 17, 2005, at 4–7, available at 
http://judiciary.house.gov/media/pdfs/johnson021705.pdf. (last visited Apr. 11, 2005) 
[hereinafter ACLU Testimony]. 
 33 Moseley, 537 U.S. at 1125. 
 34 See supra note 29 and accompanying text. 
 35 Testimony of Anne Gundelfinger, President, International Trademark Association, 
H.R. 683, Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2005, Feb. 17, 2005, at 3, 9, available at 
http://judiciary.house.gov/media/pdfs/gundelfinger021705.pdf.) (last visited Apr. 11, 
2005). 
 36 Id. at 15. 
 37 Statement of William G. Barber on Behalf of the American Intellectual Property Law 
Association on the Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2005 (H.R. 683), Feb. 17, 2005, at 
3, available at http://judiciary.house.gov/media/pdfs/barber021705.pdf. (last visited Apr. 
11, 2005). 
 38 J. Thomas McCarthy, Symposium: Trademark in Transition: Institute For 
Intellectual Property & Information Law Symposium: Proving a Trademark Has Been 
LEVY_ARTICLE_091606_CLEAN 9/17/2006  6:02:43 PM 
2006] TRADEMARK DILUTION AND CONSUMERS 1197 
 
even under state statutes, which as the Supreme Court noted 
expressly extend to likely dilution,39 there were hardly any cases in 
which the dilution cause of action made any difference in the 
outcome.40  Indeed, this history of practical inability to enforce the 
rules against dilution, first under the state laws and for nearly ten 
years under the FTDA,41 might occasion wonder whether dilution 
law might represent a solution in search of a problem. 
One might also question whether there is a sound basis for 
expressly covering “tarnishment,”42 eliminating doubts raised by 
Moseley about whether the language of the federal dilution statute 
extends beyond “blurring” to cover tarnishment.43  The theory of a 
tarnishment cause of action is that the objectionable use creates 
“negative” associations with a famous mark that has otherwise 
enjoyed only positive ones—in the language of the proposed 
statute, “association arising from the similarity between a mark or 
trade name and a famous mark that harms the reputation of the 
famous mark.”44  But tarnishment cases tend to involve 
commentary on the trademark holder–sometimes nasty 
commentary, but commentary nonetheless.45  Thus, if litigated 
Diluted: Theories or Facts?, 41 HOUS. L. REV. 713, 747 (2004) [hereinafter McCarthy, 
Proving Dilution] (“The extraordinary remedy of an antidilution law should require 
evidentiary rigor by the courts. . .  It should be viewed as a unique legal tool to be used 
only in an unusual case.”). 
 39 Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, 537 U.S. 418, 432 (2003). 
 40 McCarthy, Proving Dilution, supra note 38, at 715; ABCNY REPORT, supra note 22, 
at 11 (citing Trademark Review Commission of the United States Trademark Association 
(Trademark Review Commission), Report and Recommendations to USTA President and 
Board of Directors, 77 TRADEMARK REP. 375, 454–55 (1988)). 
 41 Federal Trademark Dilution Act, 15 U.S.C.A. § 1051 (1995). 
 42 H.R. 683, 109th Cong. § 43(c)(1) (2005); ACLU Testimony, supra note 32, at 6–7 
(expressing particular alarm over the extension of dilution law to bar tarnishment). 
 43 “Whether it is actually embraced by the statutory text, however, is another matter. 
Indeed, the contrast between the state statutes, which expressly refer to both ‘injury to 
business reputation’ and to ‘dilution of the distinctive quality of a trade name or 
trademark,’ and the federal statute which refers only to the latter, arguably supports a 
narrower reading of the FTDA.” Moseley, 537 U.S. at 432. 
 44 H.R. 683, 109th Cong. § 43(c)(2)(C) (2005). 
 45 Deere & Co. v. MTD Products, 41 F.3d 39 (2d Cir. 1994) (commercial by maker of 
the “Yard-Man,” a competitor of John Deere ride-on lawnmower, diluted the Deere 
product by portraying it as a frightened deer being chased around the yard by defendant’s 
product); Anheuser Busch v. Balducci Publ’ns, 28 F.3d 769 (8th Cir. 1994) (satirical 
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under the proposed amendment, the defendants would likely 
prevail by arguing that even if their uses were otherwise tarnishing, 
the tarnishment resulted from their explicit or implicit commentary 
on the trademark holder.46  Other examples that proponents of the 
change have cited in their arguments for reform—such as the use 
of a famous mark in a domain name to direct Internet users to a 
pornographic web site—would seem to be examples of blurring as 
well as tarnishment.47
Indeed, at the symposium, the two speakers who represented 
INTA48 and the AIPLA49 were challenged to identify even a single 
“Michelob Oily” advertisement diluted beer brand by implying that it was contaminated 
by oil). 
 46 In Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders v. Pussycat Cinema, 604 F.2d 200 (2d Cir. 1979), 
for example, the film-maker would argue that the film was commenting on the intended 
associations created by football cheerleaders by taking their provocative on-field 
behavior and costumes to an imagined extreme.  In Caterpillar, Inc. v. Walt Disney Co., 
287 F. Supp. 2d 913 (C.D. Ill. 2003), the film-maker would argue that by portraying 
Caterpillar tractors being used to tear down the good guys’ dwellings, it was simply 
pointing out that tractors can be used for bad destruction as well as good destruction.  The 
“Yard-Man” commercial litigated in the Deere case is an obvious example of 
comparative advertising, which enjoys its own separate exemption from dilution claims. 
Deere, 41 F.3d 39. 
 47 Amend the Fed. Trademark Dilution Act: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Cts., the 
Internet, and Intell. Prop. of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong., 2nd Sess. 44–
45 (Comm. Print Apr. 22, 2004) (Testimony of David Stimson, chief trademark counsel 
for Eastman Kodak), available at http://commdocs.house.gov/committees/judiciary/ 
hju93227.000/hju93227_0.HTM.  Similarly, the only case specifically identified by 
INTA President Anne Gundelfinger as showing the need for a tarnishment cause of 
action, Coca-Cola Co. v. Alma-Leo USA, 719 F. Supp. 725 (N.D. Ill. 1989), cited at page 
12 and n.41, involved a candy maker who sold a powdered candy called “Magic Powder” 
in packages that imitated the famous shape of the classic Coca-Cola bottle.  Although 
Coca-Cola argued there that the bottle created an unwanted association with cocaine, 
under the proposed amendments it could just as easily have argued that defendant’s 
product posed a likelihood of blurring by diminishing the uniqueness of the association of 
the shape with its well-known soft-drink. 
 48 The International Trademark Association is a not-for-profit membership association 
that works to advance the interests of trademark owners. International Trademark 
Association, About INTA, http://www.inta.org/index.php?option=com_content&task= 
view&id=14&Itemid=37&getcontent=4 (last visited July 8, 2006). 
 49 The American Intellectual Property Law Association is a national bar association that 
represents individuals, companies and institutions in the areas of patent, trademark, 
copyright, unfair competition law, and other fields of law related to intellectual property. 
American Intellectual Property Law Association, The History of AIPLA, 
http://www.aipla.org/Content/NavigationMenu/About_AIPLA/History/History.htm (last 
visited July 8, 2006). 
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case in which a trademark owner would be likely to prevail on a 
claim of tarnishment, notwithstanding the fair use defense, but 
would not be likely to prevail on a blurring claim.50  They were 
unable to do so.  AIPLA President Barber cited a case, which he 
had mentioned in his Congressional testimony, brought by Coca-
Cola against the maker of a poster that showed the words “Enjoy 
Cocaine” in a script mimicking Coca-Cola’s logo.51  But if that 
case were litigated under the proposed TDRA, the defendant would 
surely point out that “Enjoy Cocaine” comments on Coke in at 
least two ways.  First, the poster points to the hypocrisy of 
promoting a drink because of the “jolt” that its caffeine provides, 
while making cocaine illegal; second, it reminds viewers of the 
fact that Coca-Cola derived its name from the facts that extract of 
coca leaves was one of its active ingredients, and that early 
versions of the product contained trace amounts of cocaine.52  
Although the Coca-Cola Company no doubt would prefer to ignore 
this history, winning a lawsuit against such commentary would not 
be possible if the “fair use” exception for commentary on the 
trademark holder is to be enforced.53  The proponents of the bill 
did not try to offer any further examples.54
 50 This author issued this challenge in his opening remarks, and when they did not rise 
to the occasion, noted the omission. Sonia Katyal et al., Panel II: Trademark Dilution 
Revision Act Implications, 16 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1093 (2006) 
[hereinafter Trademark Panel] (Paul Alan Levy, panelist).  In response to this second 
challenge, Mr. Barber offered the example discussed in the text. Id. (William Barber, 
panelist). 
 51 Coca-Cola Co. v. Gemini Rising, 346 F. Supp. 1183 (E.D.N.Y. 1972); Trademark 
Panel, supra note 50 (William Barber, panelist). 
 52 Snopes.com, Cocaine-Cola, http://www.snopes.com/cokelore/cocaine.asp (last 
visited July 22, 2006). 
 53 Lanham Act § 43(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2000).
54 A similar point could be made about the example of tarnishment offered by Professor 
Beebe, A Defense of the New Federal Trademark Antidilution Law, 16 FORDHAM INTELL. 
PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1143, citing New York Stock Exchange, Inc. v. New York, 
New York Hotel, LLC, 293 F.3d 550 (2d Cir. 2002), albeit not in response to my 
challenge.  In that case, the New York Stock Exchange objected to the naming of a 
display within a casino as the “New York $lot Exchange” or “NY$E.”  The very aspect 
of the sobriquet that might be tarnishing, the sly allusion to stock trading as a form of 
high-brow gambling in which the odds are stacked against the outsider to ensure that the 
house always makes a profit, represents a parodic commentary on the trademark holder 
that would be protected by the newly adopted fair use exception. 
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But if there are not a significant number of cases in which a 
tarnishment claim is needed because it could succeed when a 
blurring claim could not, one may well ask whether the new 
tarnishment language is not an invitation to generally fruitless 
and/or unnecessary litigation.  That is not to say that the statutory 
language may not serve a purpose—if the owner of a famous mark 
has a deep pocket, and wants to overwhelm an underfunded 
opponent, maybe it is helpful to add causes of action to the 
complaint.  And a cease and desist letter, which mark holders 
commonly send to intimidate prospective defendants into giving up 
their rights without the need for litigation, can certainly be made to 
sound more threatening if it can promise two claims instead of just 
one.  But enabling more threatening demands and complaints, for 
claims that cannot otherwise succeed independently, is not a 
legitimate purpose for enacting new causes of action. 
Moreover, the reasons offered for allowing a cause of action 
for “likely” dilution in the context of blurring do not apply with 
equal force to claims of dilution by tarnishment.  The modern trend 
in the law of defamation is to require proof of actual damage to 
reputation as an element of the cause of action, even when 
defamation per se is at issue.55  Similarly, a claim for trade libel or 
commercial defamation cannot succeed without a showing of 
special damages.56  It is anomalous for the federal cause of action 
for use of trademarks that cause injury to the mark’s reputation to 
allow claims where the injury is only “likely” to occur, but has not 
yet been suffered. 
A related point goes to the issue of damages.  If “likelihood of 
dilution” is based on an injury that has not yet occurred, why 
should the diluter be liable for an award of damages?  Should not 
damages be confined to cases in which actual dilution has been 
established?  And given the fact that the bill’s proponents are 
confident that actual dilution is too high a standard because it 
cannot be met, why should dilution give rise to any damages 
claim?  Is the prospect of damages awards just an invitation to 
 55 Walker v. Grand Cent. Sanitation, 634 A.2d. 237, 241–42 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993). 
 56 KBT Corp. v. Ceridian Corp., 966 F. Supp. 369, 375 (E.D. Pa. 1997); Forum Publ’ns 
v. P.T. Publishers, 700 F. Supp. 236, 243 (E.D. Pa. 1988). 
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fruitless litigation?  Or is its purpose to make it easier to send more 
intimidating demand letters? 
The Federal Legislation Committee of the Association of the 
Bar of the City of New York has raised several additional concerns 
about the bill that seem justified.  For example, its report objected 
to the language in proposed section 43(c)(1) that would allow 
dilution claims for marks that are “distinctive . . . through acquired 
distinctiveness.”57  The stated purpose of this change is to overrule 
a line of Second Circuit authority that limits famousness to marks 
whose distinctiveness is inherent.58  When a company has 
deliberately chosen a brand name whose original meaning is 
derived from common English usage, it seems fair for the company 
to bear the risk that others might use the same name in ways that 
do not give rise to any likelihood of confusion.59  But even worse, 
in such circumstances the provision of a right of action beyond 
cases of confusion has the result of depriving other businesses of 
the right to employ words of common usage that ought to remain 
in the public domain. 
Why, for example, should the fact that American Airlines and 
United Airlines are famous marks be sufficient to allow them to 
discourage new companies in a completely different line of 
business from using American or United in their names?  Aren’t 
those the kind of words that ought to be available to all to describe 
their products?  Or, to extrapolate from the recent example 
provided by a dilution claim filed by Virgin Enterprises against 
several small companies that used the term “Virgin” in their 
business names,60 why should the presumed famousness of Virgin 
Enterprises’ mark be sufficient to afford a basis for suit against a 
new company that made statues of the Virgin Mary and called 
itself “Virgin Monuments”?61  Of course, Virgin Enterprises didn’t 
 57 ABCNY REPORT, supra note 22, at 26–27, 36–38. 
 58 TCPIP Holding Co. v. Haar Commc’ns, 244 F.3d 88, 95 (2d Cir. 2001). 
 59 Franklyn, supra note 20, at 159–63. 
 60 Virgin Enters. v. So Collective, No. 04-08964 (JGK) (S.D.N.Y. filed Nov. 12, 2004); 
see Branson Attempts to Rip “Virgin” From the Dictionary, CHILLING EFFECTS 
CLEARINGHOUSE, July 10, 2005, http://www.chillingeffects.org/weather.cgi?Weather 
ID=507. 
 61 See Amanda Cantrell, Branson trademark suit sparks debate: ‘Rebel billionaire’ 
sues small companies using word ‘Virgin’—and often wins. But is it right?, 
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sue any defendants for using “Virgin” in connection with religious 
materials.  Bullies don’t pick on opponents who are likely to be 
supported in litigation by well-funded entities like the Catholic 
Church; they pick on defendants who are unlikely to be able to 
defend themselves. But the law shouldn’t make it easier for them 
to do so.62
Although the proposed statute overrules the Second Circuit’s 
distinction between acquired and inherent distinctiveness as a basis 
for dilution claims, it incorporates that distinction as part of the 
“factors” to be used in deciding whether the challenged use caused 
“blurring.”63  These factors would presumably enable the owner of 
a new business that used a common word like “American” or 
“Virgin” in its name to argue that it does not cause appreciable 
blurring because so many others use similar terms in their names 
and, indeed, in common usage.  But that possibility is fairly small 
comfort to an individual or small business that is threatened with a 
dilution claim.  Trademark claims are notoriously expensive to 
litigate.64  Although multi-factor tests often have the advantage of 
allowing courts to be flexible and to tailor their decisions to 
particular facts, they have the disadvantages of increasing the 
scope of allowable discovery and substantially increasing the 
expense of the litigation.  A new or small business simply cannot 
afford to spend hundreds of thousands of dollars in legal fees to 
litigate the “dilution by blurring” factors in order to establish its 
CNNMONEY.COM, June 29, 2005, http://money.cnn.com/2005/06/29/news/newsmakers/ 
branson_suit/index.htm. 
 62 Although the use of the term “Virgin” to describe the mother of Christ long precedes 
the famousness of Virgin Enterprises, that would not afford a defense to a new company 
under the rule that a dilution claim may be brought only against “a person who, at any 
time after the owner’s mark has become famous, commences use of” the allegedly 
diluting mark. § 43(c)(1).  The Church itself could continue to use the term “Virgin” to 
describe its products, but a company founded today could not. 
 63 These factors include “the degree of inherent or acquired distinctiveness of the 
famous mark,” Lanham Act § 43(c)(2)(B)(ii), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(B)(ii) (2000), and 
“the extent to which the owner of the famous mark is engaging in substantially exclusive 
use of the mark,” Lanham Act § 43(c)(2)(B)(iii), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(B)(iii) (2000). 
 64 Ethan Horwitz, Cost of Action vs. Damages in Trademark Infringement Actions in 
the United States, FICPI 5TH OPEN FORUM, Nov. 1999, http://www.ficpi.org/library/ 
montecarlo99/damages.html (last visited July 22, 2006) (noting that an AIPLA study 
shows that a typical trademark infringement case costs $150,000 through discovery and 
$300,000 through trial). 
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right to sell “American” brand widgets.  Moreover, the distinction 
between inherent and acquired distinctiveness is not given any role 
in determining claims of dilution by tarnishment.  Thus, the 
mention of “inherent distinctiveness” among the blurring factors is 
not an adequate replacement for the Second Circuit rule limiting 
famousness to inherently distinctive marks.65
II. SPEECH-RELATED CONCERNS RAISED BY THE BILL 
Still, these questions have not been Public Citizen’s main 
concerns.  Instead, its advocacy about the bill has focused on two 
changes made in the bill’s revisions to the “exclusions” section, 
which are paragraph (4) of the existing statute, and are now 
paragraph (3) of the bill.  Section 43(c)(1) of the Act limits the 
cause of action for dilution to “commercial use in commerce,” and 
the exclusions provision of section 43, section 43(c)(4)(B), gives 
express protection to “non-commercial” uses of trademarks.66  In 
H.R. 683, however, the limiting words “commercial use in 
commerce” were eliminated from section 43(c)(1).  Moreover, 
although as originally introduced in the House the bill still 
contained the defense of “non-commercial use” in section 43(c)(3) 
(the new exclusions paragraph), that exception was eliminated in 
the course of House Committee hearings, and replaced by a second 
“fair use” provision allowing “fair use . . . including for purposes 
of identifying and parodying, criticizing, or commenting upon the 
famous mark owner or the goods or services of the famous mark 
owner.”67  Second, as introduced in the House, the bill would 
replace the coverage of the exclusions section, which under section 
43(c)(4) stated, “the following shall not be actionable under this 
section,” to read instead that “the following shall not be actionable 
as dilution by blurring or dilution by tarnishment under this 
 65 TCPIP Holding Co. v. Haar Commc’ns, 244 F.3d 88, 95 (2d Cir. 2001). 
 66 Lanham Act § 43(c)(4)(B), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(4)(B) (2000). 
 67 Trademark Dilution Act of 2005: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Cts., the Internet, 
and Intell. Prop. of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. (2005). H.R. 683, 
available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/useftp.cgi?IPaddress=162.140.64. 
128&filename=98924.pdf&directory=/diskb/wais/data/109_house_hearings [hereinafter 
Trademark Dilution Act Hearing]. 
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subsection.”68  Both provisions raised our concerns because of 
their potential impact on protected speech.  These concerns are 
both theoretical and practical. 
The changes are problematic in part because they increase the 
likelihood that trademark claims will be threatened or pursued 
against constitutionally protected speech implicating concerns 
under the First Amendment.  The First Amendment applies, of 
course, because, even though trademark litigation is pursued 
between private parties, a court is a government actor, and hence a 
damages award based on speech, like an injunction against speech, 
must be consistent with the First Amendment.69  Moreover, the 
First Amendment limits Congress’ power to enact a “law” 
restricting speech.70  Accordingly, to the extent that the domain of 
trademark law is extended beyond the use of marks to identify the 
source of competing commercial products, the First Amendment 
has the potential to raise serious concerns. 
For example, in the typical trademark case, a use may be 
deemed infringing because it is “likely” to cause consumers to be 
“confused” about the source or affiliation of a product or service 
offered by the accused infringer.71  The application of such a 
standard can be explained in First Amendment terms because of 
the lower level of protection that is afforded to commercial 
speech.72  But the First Amendment does not authorize regulating 
noncommercial speech simply because it is misleading.73  For 
example, a political flyer or a newspaper article about a public 
figure could not be enjoined, or made the basis for an award of 
damages, simply because some readers would “likely” find it 
“confusing.”  The concept of regulating speech that has the 
potential to be merely misleading, even though it is not strictly 
speaking false, has developed over the thirty years since the 
 68 Lanham Act § 43(c)(4), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(4) (2000). 
 69 Org. for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415, 418 (1971) (injunction); N.Y. Times 
Co. v. Sullivan, 364 U.S. 254, 265 (1964) (damages). 
 70 See id. at 269. 
 71 See Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 894, 904 (9th Cir. 2002). 
 72 Id. at 905 (“[C]onsumer protection rationale [for trademark relief]—averting what is 
essentially a fraud on the consuming public—is wholly consistent with the theory of the 
First Amendment, which does not protect commercial fraud.”). 
 73 N.Y. Times, 376 U.S. at 271. 
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Supreme Court first extended First Amendment protection to 
commercial speech.74  Unlike noncommercial speech, commercial 
speech can be regulated even if it is “not provably false, or even 
wholly false, but only deceptive or misleading.”75  Courts 
commonly contrast the broad scope that is afforded to the 
regulation of misleading speech in commercial contexts with the 
much narrower forms of regulation that are permitted for non-
commercial speech.76  Trademark injunctions and similar remedies 
have been upheld against First Amendment attack precisely on the 
ground that it is only commercial abuses that are being regulated.77  
And, when trademark owners have attempted to invoke the 
Lanham Act to prohibit allegedly “confusing” uses that were 
strictly non-commercial, a number of courts have been quick to 
insist that the trademark laws are limited to the commercial 
context.78  The Lanham Act is commonly construed narrowly to 
avoid impinging on First Amendment protections that extend to 
 74 Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357, 367 (2002); Lorillard Tobacco Co. 
v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 554 (2001). 
 75 Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1, 9 (1979). 
 76 Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 68 (1983) (Although “[a] 
company has the full panoply of protections available to its direct comments on public 
issues, . . . there is no reason for providing similar constitutional protection when such 
statements are made in the context of commercial transactions.”); Bates v. State Bar of 
Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 383 (1977) (“[T]he leeway for untruthful or misleading expression 
that has been allowed in other contexts has little force in the commercial arena.”); Smith 
v. United States, 431 U.S. 291, 318 (1977) (“Although . . . misleading statements in a 
political oration cannot be censored, . . . misleading representations in a securities 
prospectus may surely be regulated.”); Young v. Am. Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 
68 (1976) (“[R]egulatory commissions may prohibit businessmen from making 
statements which, though literally true, are potentially deceptive.”). 
 77 White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395, 1401 (9th Cir. 1992) (rules 
against exploitation of personality permissible under First Amendment because of 
commercial speech context); E&J Gallo Winery v. Gallo Cattle Co., 967 F.2d 1280, 1297 
(9th Cir. 1992) (trademark injunction permissible because it limits commercial speech). 
 78 Taubman Co. v. Webfeats, 319 F.3d 770, 774 (6th Cir. 2003) (In reversing a 
preliminary injunction against an allegedly misleading domain name for non-commercial 
shopping “fan site,” the court stated, that the “Lanham Act is constitutional because it 
only regulates commercial speech, which is entitled to reduced protection under the First 
Amendment.”); CPC Int’l, Inc. v. Skippy Inc., 214 F.3d 456, 462 (4th Cir. 2000) 
(reversing injunction and enforcing order in previous trademark case that forbade Web 
site criticizing trademark owner because the Web site “served a primarily informational 
purpose, not a commercial one”). 
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non-commercial speech,79 and when relief is sought under state 
trademark laws or federal statutes affording special trademark-like 
protection but that do not contain language limiting the statute’s 
scope to commercial uses, courts have been forced to invoke the 
First Amendment directly to forbid enforcement.80
In previous years, members of Congress have been acutely 
sensitive to the dangers posed by the extension of trademark law to 
regulate non-commercial speech.  Thus, in the course of adding a 
cause of action for false advertising to the Lanham Act,81 the 
House Judiciary Committee emphasized that the change was 
intended to apply only to “commercial advertising” and not to 
political advertising, and hence, would not affect noncommercial 
speech.82  Similarly, in the course of adding a dilution cause of 
action in 1996, Senator Hatch explained that the bill “addresses 
legitimate first amendment concerns” through the noncommercial 
use exception which exempts “parody, satire, editorial and other 
 79 Cliffs Notes, Inc. v. Bantam Doubleday Dell Publ’g Group, Inc., 886 F.2d 490, 494 
(2d Cir. 1989).  When applying the section 43(a)(2) cause of action against deceptive 
advertising, courts have struggled to decide whether a particular use was non-
commercial, and hence refutable only under standards permissible under New York Times 
v. Sullivan, or whether it was commercial speech and hence more easily regulated under 
commercial speech standards.  See Porous Media Corp. v. Pall Corp., 173 F.3d 1109, 
1119–21 (8th Cir. 1999).  See also Semco, Inc. v. Amcast, Inc., 52 F.3d 108, 111–14 (6th 
Cir. 1995).  See also U.S. Healthcare, Inc. v. Blue Cross of Greater Philadelphia, 898 
F.2d 914, 927–39 (3d Cir. 1990). 
 80 See L.L. Bean, Inc. v. Drake Publishers, Inc., 811 F.2d 26, 32–33 (1st Cir. 1987) 
(Maine anti-dilution law could not constitutionally be applied to enjoin prurient parody of 
L.L. Bean catalogue).  See also Lighthawk v. Robertson, 812 F. Supp. 1095, 1097–03 
(W.D. Wash. 1993) (special federal protection for Forest Service use of Smokey the Bear 
could not constitutionally bar environmental group’s poster attacking a Forest Service 
proposal by showing Smokey with a chain saw).  See also Stop the Olympic Prison v. 
U.S. Olympic Comm., 489 F. Supp. 1112, 1124–25 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (narrowly 
construing a special federal statute providing trademark-like protection to words 
associated with Olympics to avoid application to bar use of Olympic name by group 
attacking construction plans to convert Olympic village into a prison). 
 81 Trademark Law Revision Act of 1988, adding what is now § 43(a)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 
1051 (2000). Pub. L. No. 100-667, 102 Stat 3935 (1988). 
 82 135 CONG. REC. H1207, 1217 (daily ed. Apr. 13, 1989), 1989 WL 191679 (“[T]he 
proposed change in section 43(a) should not be read in any way to limit political speech, 
consumer or editorial comment, parodies, satires, or other constitutionally protected 
material . . .  The section is narrowly drafted to encompass only clearly false and 
misleading commercial speech.”). 
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forms of expression that are not [] part of a commercial 
transaction.”83
The second reason for concern about the elimination of the 
non-commercial use defense was a much more practical one, 
relating to the realities of litigation.  In litigation over the use of 
trademarks in either domain names or meta tags for web sites 
about trademark owners, consumer critics of trademark holders 
have had a fair amount of success getting out of litigation, quickly 
and cheaply, by raising the non-commercial use defense.84  Even 
in cases where the critics’ victory was largely on other grounds, the 
non-commercial use arguments were obviously on the court’s mind 
in rejecting the trademark claims.85  Fair use, by contrast, tends to 
require application of a multi-factor test that is heavily dependent 
on context.86  The aspect of fair use that would most likely apply 
to a person who used a trademark to refer to the owner of the 
trademark or its goods is nominative use, and although courts in 
several circuits have indicated their acceptance of the proposition 
that this form of fair use exists,87 they are not in agreement on 
exactly how such fair use can be established.88  At this writing, the 
most recent statement of the standards for establishing nominative 
fair use was a Third Circuit decision that ran on for some ten pages 
to explain how nominative use cases should be analyzed under its 
three pronged test (four pages on the nominative use defense 
alone); the concurring opinion contains a lengthy critique of that 
 83 141 CONG. REC. S19306-10 (daily ed. Dec. 29, 1995), 1995 WL 770583. 
 84 E.g., Bosley Med. Inst., Inc. v. Kremer, 403 F.3d 672, 677–78 (9th Cir. 2005); 
Taubman Co. v. Webfeats, 319 F.3d 770, 774–76 (6th Cir. 2003); TMI, Inc. v. Maxwell, 
368 F.3d 433, 438 (5th Cir. 2004); Crown Pontiac, Inc. v. Ballock, 287 F. Supp. 2d 1256, 
1259 (N.D. Ala. 2003); ServiceMaster Co. v. Virga, Civil Action No. 99-2866-TUV 
(W.D. Tenn.) (case dismissed voluntarily after motion to dismiss filed).  See also Ficker 
v. Tuohy, 305 F. Supp. 2d 569, 572 (D. Md. 2004). 
 85 E.g., Lamparello v. Falwell, 420 F.3d 309, 314, 317–18 (4th Cir. 2005).  The court 
declined to reach the issue of whether commercial use is generally a condition for 
trademark liability, but held instead that initial interest confusion applies only in 
commercial context. Id. at 317. 
 86 Century 21 Real Estate Corp. v. Lendingtree, Inc., 425 F.3d 211, 224 (3d Cir. 2005). 
 87 E.g., id. at 217; Pebble Beach Co. v. Tour 18 I, Ltd., 155 F.3d 526, 546 (5th Cir. 
1998); New Kids on the Block v. News Am. Publ’g, Inc., 971 F.2d 302, 308 (9th Cir. 
1992).  None of the circuits have disapproved of the defense. 
 88 Compare Century 21, 425 F.3d at 224 with Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Welles, 279 F.3d 
796, 801–04 (9th Cir. 2002). 
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analysis.89  A large company with a substantial litigation budget 
can handle this uncertainty and can afford the litigation that is 
required to apply the defense, even though making the defense rest 
on a complicated fair use analysis may make dismissal harder to 
obtain at the motion to dismiss or summary judgment stage.  
Citizen and consumer critics are at least as likely to be worn down 
by the expense of litigation—or deterred from defending 
themselves by the prospect of incurring such costs—as they are by 
actual losses in court—and trademark cases are notoriously 
expensive.90
The non-commercial use defense was originally part of the bill 
as introduced in the House but was deleted from the bill, as part of 
a change that was responsive to criticism from the ACLU that the 
“non-commercial use” exception did not provide enough 
protection to commercial speech.91  The non-commercial use 
defense was replaced by an express fair use provision that 
protected “[f]air use of a famous mark by another person, other 
than as a designation of source for that person’s goods or services, 
including for purposes of identifying and parodying, criticizing, or 
commenting upon the famous mark owner or the goods or services 
of the famous mark owner.”92  Although this exception was plainly 
written with free speech considerations in mind, and standing alone 
was plainly a desirable addition to the bill, as a substitute for the 
non-commercial use exception it was actually worse from the 
perspective of any ordinary citizen who must face the realities of 
litigation93 for two main reasons. 
First, the limitation of the specific fair use protection to uses 
that discuss the trademark owner itself leaves out a wide range of 
 89 Century 21, 425 F.3d at 224–28, 247–50. 
 90 Posting of Declan McCullagh to http://www.politechbot.com/2005/08/25/trademark-
bill-threatens/ (Aug 25, 2005 18:19:31) (last visited Aug. 4, 2006) (posting e-mail from 
Paul Alan Levy to Declan McCullagh (Aug 25, 2005 18:19:31)). 
 91 ACLU Testimony, supra note 32, at 7–9. 
 92 Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2005 § 2, 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (2000). 
 93 One oddity of the new language is that it seems to make unnecessary the pre-existing 
exception for “[f]air use of a famous mark by another person in comparative commercial 
advertising or promotion to identify the competing goods or services of the owner of the 
famous mark.” 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (2000).  Any use of a famous mark in comparative 
advertising would necessarily be a use for purpose of “commenting” or “criticizing.” 
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trademark uses that ought to be permissible.94  Trademarks, after 
all, and famous trademarks in particular, provide important cultural 
reference points, which speakers or artists commonly use to make 
their points more clearly.95  To take one example that was cited in 
the discussions of H.R. 683: Walter Mondale’s put-down of Gary 
Hart during the 1984 primaries, using the Wendy’s slogan 
“Where’s the Beef,” would not be within the protection of 
proposed section 43(c)(3)(B).96  It is quite likely that the slogan 
would be a famous trademark even under the new definition of 
famousness; a strong case could be made for likelihood of blurring; 
and although the use was non-commercial, that alone would not be 
a protection from the dilution cause of action.  The phrase was 
used to comment, to be sure, but not to comment on Wendy’s; 
Mondale just borrowed the phrase to comment on Hart.  There are, 
indeed, a number of cases in which trademark claims have been 
brought against political figures who invoked trademarks in 
comparable ways.97
Such uses were of particular concern to the photographers, 
artists and writers who sought changes in the bill after they 
recognized how directly the proposed changes could affect them.  
In  a leading opinion by Judge Alex Kozinski construing the “non-
commercial use” exception, the Ninth Circuit had held that the 
exception extends to artistic expression even though the artistic 
work containing the expression is sold.98  Moreover, in an off-
mike discussion among the panelists at the symposium, it was 
 94 See Trademark Dilution Act Hearing, supra note 67. 
95  E.g., Alex Kozinski, Trademarks Unplugged, 68 N.Y.U. L. REV. 960, 972–76 
(1993). 
 96 See id. 
 97 In Am. Family Life Ins. Co. v. Hagan, 266 F. Supp. 2d 682, 686 (N.D. Ohio 2002), a 
candidate for governor of Ohio placed his opponent’s head on the body of a duck which 
said “Taft-quack,” not intending to say anything about AFLAC but was using their 
famous duck quack to make fun of Ohio governor Bob Taft.  In MasterCard Int’l, Inc. v. 
Nader 2000 Primary Comm., Inc., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d 1046, 1048 (S.D.N.Y. 2004), 
MasterCard sued Ralph Nader for his television commercial listing the cost of various 
political fundraising affairs, and then describing “finding out the truth” as being 
“priceless”; the Nader campaign did not invoke the famous “Priceless” campaign theme 
to comment on MasterCard but to comment on other politicians.  The non-commercial 
use exception was the key to defeating dilution claims in both of these cases. 
 98 Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, 296 F3d 894, 905–07 (9th Cir. 2002). 
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apparent that the sponsoring organizations had Judge Kozinski’s 
opinion squarely within their sights as a reason to eliminate the 
“non-commercial use” exception.  But artists find it hard to portray 
a common scene without including references to famous 
trademarks, whether it be a Coke bottle sitting on a table or the 
Empire State Building in the background.  The picture is not 
commenting on the mark so much as using the mark to establish 
the context.  Yet without the non-commercial use defense, 
photographers saw themselves as exposed to the prospect of easy 
threats of litigation. 
A rather timely threat of litigation against an artist for his use 
of a famous trademark gained particular notoriety in the weeks 
before the Senate Judiciary Committee considered the TDRA.  
Donald Stewart, a graphic artist whose drawings tended to reflect 
visual puns of their subject, was threatened for selling a drawing in 
the shape of a classic Volkswagen “bug,” which portrayed the car 
being made out of insect parts.99  Lawyers for Volkswagen of 
America threatened Stewart with suit for diluting and infringing 
their trademark,100 and several supporters of the restoration of the 
“non-commercial use” language cited this incident as showing the 
need to keep that language, because even though Stewart sold his 
artwork, this was precisely the sort of “non-commercial speech” 
that the exception has been construed as protecting.101
To be sure, in the bill that passed the House, exception (B) 
protected fair use “including” for purposes of commentary; 
perhaps it could have been argued that the language allowed other 
kinds of fair use arguments to be made, including a more general 
nominative fair use argument under standards like those set forth in 
 99 The drawing can be seen at http://www.dsart.com/Gallery/vw_bug.htm (last visited 
July 23, 2006). 
 100 Patrick Hickerson, Bug-like Artwork is Bugging Carmaker: Volkswagen Says 
Drawing Infringes on Trademark, BIRMINGHAM NEWS, Jan. 26, 2006, at 1. 
 101 E.g., Letter on H.R. 683 from Joan Claybrook, Public Citizen, et al. to the 
S. Judiciary Comm. (Feb. 3, 2006), at 6 (available at http://www.citizen.org/documents/ 
Judiciary%20Committee%20letter%20on%20H.R.%20683.pdf (last visited July 23, 
2006); Letter from Donald Stewart to Senator Jeff Sessions (Jan. 23, 2006) (available  
at http://www.stockphotographer.info/images/stories/Legislation/don%20stewart%20 
letter.pdf) (last visited July 23, 2006). 
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Century 21102 or Playboy v. Welles.103  This argument was 
bolstered by the Hatch-Leahy substitute that was prepared in 
anticipation of mark-up in the Senate Judiciary Committee, which 
prefaced the “comparative” and “commentary” fair use language 
with the words, “any fair use, including nominative and descriptive 
fair use, . . . including in connection with . . .”  Yet another version 
that was circulated was even more helpful, stating that the 
protected fair use was “including, but not limited to, use in 
connection with” comparative and commentary uses.  Each of 
these versions was helpful in at least making clear that there could 
or would be an opportunity to argue other forms of fair use. 
But what this language could not do was provide the straight-
forward, easily invoked defense that “non-commercial use” 
provided.  Letters to the Judiciary Committee from a current and 
former executive director of the American Society of Media 
Photographers104 each referred to a case in which a photographer 
had been sued over a poster showing the Rock and Roll Hall of 
Fame.105 They pointed out that although the defendant had won the 
case, he had lost the war, because the costs of litigation had put 
him out of business.106  The benefit of the non-commercial use 
exception is that it provides an inexpensive way out of such 
litigation.  Indeed, a compilation of examples of incidental uses of 
trademarks to illustrate points under discussion, but without any 
intention of commenting on the trademark holder for the purpose 
of criticism or parody, was circulated to Senate Judiciary 
Committee members on the eve of markup, and was reportedly 
extremely effective in showing just what was at stake.107  
Therefore, we were relieved when, on the eve of the Senate 
 102 Century 21 Real Estate Corp. v. Lendingtree, Inc., 425 F.3d 211 (3d Cir. 2005). 
 103 Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Welles, 279 F.3d 796 (9th Cir. 2002). 
 104 Letter from Victor Perlman to Senator Orrin Hatch, (Feb. 7, 2006) (available at 
http://www.asmp.org/news/spec2006/HR683letter.php) (last visited July 23, 2006); Letter 
from Richard Weisgrau to Senator Orrin Hatch (Feb. 3, 2006) (available at 
http://www.stockphotographer.info/images/stories/Richard_Weisgrau/letter_to_senator_ 
hatch.pdf) (last visited July 23, 2006). 
 105 Rock & Roll Hall of Fame & Museum. v. Gentile Prods., 134 F.3d 749 (6th Cir. 
1998). 
 106 See Perlman, supra note 104; Weisgrau, supra note 104. 
 107 A copy of the compilation is posted at http://www.citizen.org/documents/ 
TMDilutionExamples.pdf (last visited July 23, 2006). 
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Judiciary Committee’s markup, the Senators agreed to restore the 
non-commercial use exception to section 43(c)(3). 
One major problem remains in the bill at this writing, however.  
Under current law, the three exceptions in section 43(c)(4) of the 
Lanham Act, under the language of the statute, apply to “this 
section.”  Because standard drafting parlance refers to sections of 
the United States Code as “sections,”108 while identifying the first 
level of subdivisions of sections as “subsections,” and because 
other provisions in section 43 expressly refer to “section” when 
Congress meant to refer to section 43 and to “subsection” when 
Congress meant to refer to subsection (a) or (c),109 the language 
“this section” is properly construed to mean that claims under 
subsection (a) of section 43 are also subject to these provisos.110  
But under the bill, the exceptions would apply instead to “dilution 
by blurring and dilution by tarnishment under this subsection.”111  
Thus, the protections for fair use, non-commercial use, and news 
reporting would no longer extend to suits for infringement under 
 108 See House Legislative Counsel’s Manual on Drafting Style, HLC No. 104-1, p. 24 
(1995) and Senate Office of the Legislative Counsel, Legislative Drafting Manual 10 
(1997) (cited in Koons Buick v. Nigh, 543 U.S. 50, 60–61 (2004)). 
 109 For example, § 43(b) bars the importation of goods labeled “in contravention of the 
provisions of this section.”  Subsection (b) does not specify anything that could be 
contravened.  The provision obviously uses the term “section” to refer both to § 43(a) and 
§ 43(c).  Other paragraphs of subsection (c) refer specifically to actions brought “under 
this subsection.” Lanham Act §§ 43(c)(1) (“to obtain such other relief as is provided in 
this subsection”); Lanham Act §§ 43(c)(2) (“In an action brought under this subsection”).  
Similarly, in describing the in rem cause of action against domain names whose owners 
cannot be sued in the United States, the Anti-Cybersquatting Protection Act (“ACPA”) 
allows claims to be brought over marks that are “registered . . ., or protected under 
subsection (a) and (c) of this section.” § 43(d)(2)(A)(i), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d) (2000). 
 110 The issue was been expressly decided in Planned Parenthood v. Bucci. 1997 WL 
133313 (SDNY) at *7, aff’d mem., 152 F.3d 920 (2d Cir. 1998), cited with approval, 
OBH, Inc. v. Spotlight Magazine, 86 F. Supp. 2d 176, 196–97 (W.D.N.Y. 2000), and 
PGC Property v. Wainscott/Sagaponack Property Owners, 250 F. Supp. 2d 136, 141 
(E.D.N.Y. 2003).  Ficker v. Tuohy quotes the language of § 43(c)(4)(B) in holding that 
non-commercial use is not actionable under section 43, which is not surprising since the 
“this section” argument was made expressly in Tuohy’s brief. 305 F. Supp. 2d 569, 572 
(D. Md. 2004).  TMI v. Maxwell observed that the non-commercial use exception extends 
to section 43(a) without expressly addressing the “this section” language that was 
addressed in the briefs. 368 F.3d 433, 436–38 and n.2 (5th Cir. 2004). 
 111 Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2005, H. Rep. 109-23, 109th Cong., 1st Sess. 
(2005). 
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section 43(a), which is the principal means of enforcing 
unregistered trademarks.112
This change is particularly troubling with respect to the “fair 
use” exception, because a close reading of section 33(b), which 
creates the defense of fair use, shows that it appears to be limited 
to defenses against claimed infringement of registered trademarks 
(which can be pursued under section 32 of the Act).113  If the 
applicability of the fair use exclusion in section 43(c) is no longer 
to apply to all of “this section,” then there will be no fair use 
provisions which, under the literal words of the statute, will apply 
to unfair competition or infringement claims under section 43(a).  
To be sure, in cases decided after section 43(c)(4) was enacted, 
lower federal courts have ignored the literal fair use language of 
the Act in several ways, both by discussing the fair use defense in 
cases brought solely under section 43 of the Act without 
considering whether that defense stemmed from section 33(b)(4) or 
section 43(c)(4),114 and by applying the fair use defense in section 
43(a) cases brought before the enactment of section 43(c)(4).115  
On the other hand, the Supreme Court’s recent ventures into 
trademark law used analyses that were closely tailored to careful 
reading of the statutory language.116  Thus, although the argument 
could certainly be made that the courts have always understood fair 
use to provide a defense to section 43(a) claims regardless of the 
language of section 33(b), enacting a statute that deliberately 
 112 Id. 
 113 “Such conclusive evidence of the right to use the registered mark shall be subject to 
proof of infringement as defined in section 32, and shall be subject to the following 
defenses or defects: . . . (4) That the use of the name, term or device charged to be an 
infringement is a use, otherwise than as a mark, . . . of a term or device which is 
descriptive of and used fairly and in good faith only to describe the goods or services of 
such party, or their geographic origin . . .” 
 114 E.g., Downing v. Abercrombie & Fitch, 265 F.3d 994, 1009 (9th Cir. 2001). 
 115 E.g., Abdul-Jabbar v. General Motors Corp., 85 F.3d 407, 412–13 (9th Cir. 1996); 
A.J. Canfield Co. v. Vess Beverages, 796 F.2d 903, 908 (7th Cir. 1986).  Indeed, the 
doctrine of nominative fair use has arisen despite the fact that the concept cannot be 
found either in the express fair use language of section 33(b)(4),which allows fair use in 
of a trademarked word mark in its descriptive sense, or the fair use language of section 
43(c)(4)(A), which pertains only to “comparative commercial advertising.” 
 116 E.g., KP Permanent Make-Up v. Lasting Impressions I, 543 U.S. 111, 117–21 
(2004); Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23, 31–38 (2003); 
Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, 537 U.S. 418, 432–34 (2003). 
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removes the “this section” language making fair use a proper 
defense to section 43(a) claims just lays the ground for a statutory 
construction argument that can be avoided, and thus risks putting 
fair users at risk in a way that Congress ought to avoid. 
The repeal of the “this section” language similarly puts at risk 
the argument that the trademark laws do not apply to non-
commercial uses.117  There are, to be sure, other snippets of 
statutory language on which defendants have relied over the years, 
and which courts have invoked, to confine the application of the 
trademark laws to commercial uses.  Section 43(a) provides for 
civil liability on the part of a person “who, on or in connection 
with goods or services, or any container for goods, uses in 
commerce any [mark].”  Similar language appears in section 32, 
providing for liability of a person who “use[s] in commerce any 
[mark] in connection with the sale, offering for sale, distribution or 
advertising of any goods or services.”118  The “in connection with 
goods or services” language has been understood in several cases 
as limiting the scope of the infringement cause of action to 
commercial uses,119 and other courts have seized on the “use in 
commerce” language, coupled with the statutory definition of “use 
in commerce” as meaning “bona fide use of the mark in the 
ordinary course of trade,” to decide that even though the statute 
defines “commerce” as extending to the full reach of the 
Commerce Clause,120 the statutory phrase “use in commerce” 
limits the scope of the infringement cause of action.121  Moreover, 
 117 Trademark Dilution Revision Act, H.R. 683, 109th Cong. (2006). 
 118 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (2000). 
 119 Bosley Med. Inst. Inc. v. Kremer, 403 F.3d 672, 677 (9th Cir. 2005); Taubman Co. v. 
WebFeats, 319 F.3d 770, 775 (6th Cir. 2003). 
 120 Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., 344 U.S. 280, 283 (1952). 
 121 Karl Storz Endoscopy-Am. v. Surgical Techs. Inc., 285 F.3d 848, 855 (9th Cir. 
2002); Karl Storz Endoscopy-Am. v. Fiber Tech Med., 4 Fed. Appx. 128, 131 (4th Cir. 
2001); Int’l Assoc. of Machinists & Aerospace Workers, AFL-CIO v. Winship Green 
Nursing Center, 103 F.3d 196, 209–10 (1st Cir. 1996) (concurring opinion); WHS Entm’t 
Ventures v. United Paperworkers Int’l Union, 997 F. Supp. 946, 949 (M.D. Tenn. 1998).  
Several recent cases have also decided rejected trademark claims based on pop-up 
advertising on the ground that the defendant did not make the requisite “use in 
commerce.” E.g., 1-800 Contacts. v. WhenU.Com, Inc., 414 F.3d 400, 411–12 (2d Cir. 
2005).  Although the Second Circuit discussed several cases as construing the phrase “use 
in commerce,” in the end it treated “use” as a requirement distinct from “in commerce.” 
Id. 
LEVY_ARTICLE_091606_CLEAN 9/17/2006  6:02:43 PM 
2006] TRADEMARK DILUTION AND CONSUMERS 1215 
 
wholly apart from the precise language of the statute, the very way 
in which the courts normally discuss the likelihood of confusion in 
deciding infringement claims,122 not to speak of the 
characterization that many courts give to the “likelihood of 
confusion factors,” assumes that trademark law is addressed solely 
to commercial competitors.123
However, neither of these arguments is without counterweight, 
in the language of the statute with respect to “in connection 
with,”124 and in a number of cases stating that “use in commerce” 
itself extends to the limits of the Commerce Clause.125  Even more 
 122 E.g., Newton v. Thomason, 22 F.3d 1455, 1463 (9th Cir. 1994) (to raise an inference 
of a likelihood of confusion, [plaintiff] must show that [defendant] intended to profit by 
confusing consumers”); Lang v. Retirement Living Pub. Co., 949 F.2d 576, 582–83 (2d 
Cir. 1991) (“Lanham Act seeks to prevent consumer confusion that allows a seller to pass 
of his goods as the goods of another. . . . [T]he relevant confusion is that which affects 
the purchasing and selling of the goods or services in question. . . .  Trademark 
infringement protects against mistaken purchasing decisions and not against confusion 
generally.”); see also Prestonettes v. Coty, 264 U.S. 359, 368 (1924) (Holmes, J.) (in pre-
Lanham Act case, “trade-mark only gives the right to prohibit the use of [a word] so far 
as to protect the owner’s good will against the sale of another’s product as his.”).  
Similarly, courts have rejected attempts by consumers to sue companies under § 43(a) on 
the ground that “[t]he act’s purpose, as defined in Section 45, is exclusively to protect the 
interests of a purely commercial class against unscrupulous commercial conduct.”  Made 
in the USA Found. v. Phillips, 365 F.3d 278, 280 (4th Cir. 2004); Colligan v. Activities 
Club of N.Y., 442 F.2d 686, 692 (2d Cir. 1971). 
 123 See Newton, 22 F.3d 1455; Lang, 949 F.2d 576.  See also Sunlight Saunas, Inc. v. 
Sundance Sauna, Inc., 427 F. Supp. 2d 1032, 1056–57 and n.26 (D. Kan. 2006) 
(trademark laws are limited to regulation of commercial speech as defined by First 
Amendment doctrine). 
 124 See 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (2000).  Section 43(a) does not contain the words “sale, 
offering for sale, distribution, or advertising” that appear in section 32(1).  Section 
43(a)(1)(A) does allow a claim when the defendant is likely to cause confusion about the 
origin “of his or her goods, services, or commercial activities.”  It could be argued that 
because the statute uses commercial activities in a series with “goods [or] services,” it is 
implicit that goods and services need not be not commercial.  Or, it could be argued that 
the word “other” is implicit, as in “goods, services or [other] commercial services.”  
Similarly, because section 43(a)(1)(B) expressly limits the cause of action for false 
advertising to “commercial advertising or promotion,” perhaps it is implicit that the 
goods and services language in the introductory language of section 43(a) is not limited 
to commercial goods and services. 
 125 Bosley Medical Inst. v. Kremer, 403 F.3d 672, 677 (9th Cir. 2005); Planetary 
Motion, Inc. v. Techplosion, Inc., 261 F.3d 1188, 1194 (11th Cir. 2001); United We 
Stand Am., Inc. v. United We Stand, Am. N.Y., Inc., 128 F.3d 86, 92–93 (2d Cir.1997).  
There is no question that the reason why the statutory definition was enacted was to 
accompany the addition of “use in commerce” language to the process for registering 
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worrisome is the inference about Congressional intent that might 
be supported by what trademark owners will certainly argue was a 
deliberate decision to withdraw the application of the 
noncommercial use exception from applicability to the entirety of 
“this section.”  Moreover, there is not a perfect fit between the 
doctrine of “non-commercial speech” in the First Amendment 
sense and the general rule that even non-profit institutions whose 
main activities consist of non-commercial speech—for example, 
political parties, churches, and public interest organizations—are 
allowed both to register trademarks and to enforce them against 
rival institutions that adopt confusing names to siphon off 
contributions and memberships.126
And yet, despite the fact that the language has so clearly been 
changed in a way that would appear to be deliberate, there is some 
reason to wonder whether, until we called the issue to public 
attention, any members of Congress had focused on the 
implications of the elimination of the “this section” language.  
None of the witnesses who testified before the IP subcommittee of 
the House Judiciary Committee in both 2004 and 2005 mentioned 
the elimination of the “this section” language, and neither did the 
House Report on the bill.127  The AIPLA submitted a written 
statement that came close to being deceptive in implying that the 
exclusions were being expanded along with the expansion of 
dilution to cover tarnishment expressly.128
trademarks.  But nothing in the language of the statute even hints that the definition is 
limited to that context, and § 45 expressly comprehends “the construction of this 
chapter,” i.e., Chapter 22 of Title 15.  Other definitional provisions in the Lanham Act are 
limited to a particular “subchapter,” see Lanham Act § 60, 15 U.S.C. § 1141 (2000), or 
even a single subsection or paragraph, e.g., Lanham Act §§ 34(d)(1)(B), 32(2)(E) (2000). 
 126 E.g., United We Stand, 128 F.3d 86; NAACP v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, 
753 F.2d 131 (DC Cir.1985); Gideons Int’l v. Gideon 300 Ministries, 94 F. Supp. 2d 566 
(E.D. Pa. 1999) (Although it is a non-profit, “by incorporating, raising money, and 
distributing goods and services to the consuming public, Gideon 300 engages in 
commercial activity.”). 
 127 Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2005, H. Rep. 109-23, 109th Cong., 1st Sess. 
(2005). 
 128 “AIPLA supports proposed section 1125(c)(3) which would extend the existing 
defenses for dilution to blurring and tarnishment causes of action.  Currently, the FTDA 
provides that the following “shall not be actionable” under this statute: [listing the three].  
These defenses should be extended to the specifically defined causes of action for 
blurring and tarnishment.” HEARING BEFORE THE SUBCOMM. ON CTS., THE INTERNET AND 
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We have heard that some trademark-owner interests are 
worried about the impact that the newly rewritten fair use language 
might have on section 43(a) claims, but since that language was 
not in the original draft of the bill, that could not be an explanation 
for the change.  Nor have we been able to get any explanation of 
any actual problems that the new fair use language would cause 
when applied to section 43(a) claims.  Indeed, if this were the real 
problem, there is no reason to eliminate the non-commercial use 
and news reporting defenses to section 43(a) claims.  Moreover, 
because the “this section” language had been deleted when the bill 
was first introduced in the House, before there had been any 
change in the fair use language, that could not have been the real 
reason for the change. 
Instead of grappling with these concerns, some of the bill’s 
proponents claim that this change was not deliberate.129  But that is 
hardly an argument for keeping the new language.  If it wasn’t 
deliberate, there would seem to be no reason not to restore the “this 
section” language, at least as it applies to the “non-commercial” 
and news reporting exceptions. 
We have heard three other arguments about why the “this 
section” language should not be retained in the exclusions 
provision.  The first is that non-commercial use is protected by the 
First Amendment, so section 43(a) to non-commercial speech and 
news reporting would be unconstitutional anyway.  To be sure, the 
First Amendment issues are most pronounced in the dilution 
context, where speech is being suppressed despite the complete 
absence even of any concern about confusion.  But in the context 
of noncommercial speech, it is troubling to speak of imposing legal 
sanctions for speech which is only “likely” to be “confusing,” and 
not actually false and not intentionally false.  Even more troubling 
is the possible issuance of a preliminary injunction against non-
commercial speech—in First Amendment terms, a prior restraint—
INTELL. PROP. OF THE COMMITTEE ON JUDICIARY, H.R., TO AMEND THE FEDERAL 
TRADEMARK DILUTION ACT, 108th Cong., 2d Sess. (Comm. Print Apr. 22, 2004), at 59 
(emphasis added).  Note that the exclusions in existing law were misdescribed as 
applying only to dilution; the language “this section” was not quoted but rather 
characterized as applying to “this statute”; and the word “extend” was used twice. 
 129 See generally Trademark Panel, supra note 50 (Barton Beebe, panelist). 
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based on no more than a rough assessment that success on the 
merits of “likely confusion” is more probable than not. 
Moreover, Congress should not be in the business of passing 
unconstitutional laws and leaving it to the courts to sort out the 
problems.  When Congress enacted section 43(c) back in 1996, it 
did the responsible thing by carving out the constitutional 
problems, and it did the same thing when it added section 43(a)(2) 
in the late 1980’s, taking note of the constitutional issues and 
adding language to address the issue.  Second, litigators who 
represent consumers sued for non-commercial speech rightly 
worry about the chilling effect of a change in the law that strips 
consumers of a non-commercial speech defense claim that has 
been repeatedly recognized in the case law.130  The noncommercial 
speech defense is especially important because, if a case has to be 
litigated on likelihood of confusion, the expense and complexity of 
the litigation become much greater.  That difference both makes it 
harder to find a pro bono lawyer, and increases the burden of the 
litigation if the consumer has to pay a lawyer.  Moreover, when 
consumers receive demand letters quoting the law, there will be no 
evident exception for non-commercial speech, and they are more 
likely to simply surrender their rights.  And, if they try to 
persevere, it is going to be much harder for them to afford to 
defend themselves. 
Additionally, in the course of any ensuing litigation, trademark 
owners would surely point to Congress’ deliberate elimination of 
the non-commercial use defense, and urge the Court not to hold the 
statute unconstitutional in part.131  From the standpoint of 
defending those who use trademarks to explain how and why they 
are making criticisms, it is preferable to be able to point to 
language in a statute that avoids the need to confront a 
constitutional issue than to have to argue that a federal statute 
cannot constitutionally be applied to the particular case.  
Accordingly, this is a change that will have a very deleterious 
impact on the practicalities of litigation from the consumer 
standpoint. 
 130 See supra notes 26–27 and 99–106 and accompanying text. 
 131 See supra note 128. 
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In a letter circulated to ranking members of the House 
Judiciary Committee in April 2006, the AIPLA argued that, if the 
“this section” language were left in place, it would create an 
unintended loophole in § 43(d), the ACPA.  But that is far from the 
case.  After all, as the AIPLA conceded, the ACPA was 
“enacted . . . to deal with the rampant problem of profiteers 
registering the trademarks of companies as domain names and 
trying to extract money from trademark owners wishing to own the 
domain names that incorporate their trademarks.”132  To that end, 
the statute applies when the defendant acts with “a bad faith intent 
to profit” from the mark.133  Because Congress found that many 
cybersquatters would register many names and just sit on them 
without using them and without making an explicit demand for 
payment, it enumerated a set of factors to help courts decide the 
purpose for picking the domain name134 and employed, as one 
factor for deciding whether bad faith intent to profit exists, whether 
the defendant made a “bona fide noncommercial or fair use of the 
mark on a web site accessible under the domain name.”135
AIPLA posited that allowing noncommercial or fair use to 
override a bad faith intent to profit would transform that factor into 
a dispositive issue, thus undermining the multifactor scheme of the 
ACPA.  But its argument does not hold water, because AIPLA 
loses sight of what is and is not a noncommercial or fair use of a 
domain name.  If the various factors point to the conclusion that 
the defendant registered or used a domain name for reasons of 
extortion, then that defendant could not possibly be using the name 
either fairly or noncommercially.  After all, such a person is trying 
to make money, so his use can scarcely be said to be 
noncommercial.  The Ninth Circuit had no difficulty coming to 
such a conclusion in a pre-ACPA case, because, as the court 
 132 AIPLA Letter, at 1.  A copy is in the files of the Fordham Intellectual Property, 
Media & Entertainment Law Journal.  See Virtual Works v. Volkswagen of Am., 238 
F.3d 264, 267 (4th Cir. 2001) (“the Internet version of a land grab . . . in order to force 
the rightful owners of the marks to pay for the right to engage in electronic commerce 
under their own brand name”). 
 133 Section 43(d)(1)(A)(i). 
 134 Section 43(c)(1)(B)(i)(I)–(IX). 
 135 Section 43(c)(1)(B)(i)(IV). 
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reasoned, a cybersquatter’s business is selling domain names.136  
Moreover, the person has acted in bad faith, so it is hard to argue 
that there is fair use.  Thus, there will be no cases in which a 
person acted with a bad faith intent to profit but can escape liability 
under the exclusions. 
The final argument made for not restoring the “this section” 
language is that adoption of the that language was accidental in 
1996, because the drafters of the original 1996 provisions were 
only thinking about providing exceptions to the dilution 
provisions, and it had not occurred to them that “this section,” 
when incorporated into the United States Code, would refer to 
section 43 and not to the provision that they were inserting into the 
Lanham Act.137  According to this argument, inclusion of the 
words “this section” was a drafting error, and the new language is 
desirable because it better implements the original intention of the 
drafters.138  Because the other arguments being put forward for 
refusing to restore the original language of the statute are so 
tenuous, this is probably the best explanation for why the change 
has been made, although it is certainly at odds with the argument 
advanced by the same sponsors that the change with not 
deliberate.139  And, on the assumption that the change is intended 
to fix a drafting error, it should not be taken as an expression of 
desire to overrule any of the court decisions finding limitations to 
commercial use in other provisions of the statute. 
But although the “this section” language was probably an 
accident in 1996, it was a happy accident, because non-commercial 
use gives consumers an easier way out of trademark litigation than 
the application of multi-factor tests for “likely confusion” or “fair 
use” would provide.  It is the proponents of change who ought to 
have the burden of explaining why the old language is causing 
problems, and the case has simply not been made that “this 
section” causes problems under the current statute. 
 136 Panavision Int’l v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316, 1325 (9th Cir. 1998). 
 137 See generally Trademark Panel, supra note 50 (Barton Beebe, panelist). 
 138 Id. 
 139 See generally id. 
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It must be acknowledged that the application of the 
noncommercial use exception to section 43(a) claims is not the 
perfect solution for consumers—it does not stretch far enough in 
some respects, and it may even go too far in some respects.  Nor is 
it the only language in the Lanham Act on which consumers can 
rely for protection when they are sued for using a trademarked 
name for the non-commercial purpose of criticizing a trademark 
holder.  If the Lanham Act were being redrafted in its entirety, it 
would nice to be able to include changes to address the problem of 
applying section 32 of the Act in contexts that Congress never 
attended to reach, and which also raise significant First 
Amendment issues.  But like the bill’s proponents, the consumer 
and arts advocates and civil libertarians must also accept that this 
bill is not designed to resolve all the ills of the Lanham Act, but 
only to revise section 43(c) to resolve certain problems that have 
arisen in its interpretation over the past nine years.  Fixing the 
Lanham Act in other respects can wait for a later day. 
